When Michael Lewis wrote Moneyball, a handful readers misinterpreted its meaning in a variety of ways. The truly dense individuals interpreted the book as an extended argument for Billy Beane’s prowess as a General Manager. Others simply read it as a case for On-Base Percentage as baseball’s most important and underappreciated statistic. The book’s point, of course, was to demonstrate how to exploit certain traits that had been undervalued by a particular market, using baseball as a case study.
The $8MM utility man
In 2010, OBP is no longer underappreciated. Even the casual baseball fan often places just as much importance on OBP as he does on batting average. Cristian Guzman? Sure, he hits .300, but the guy never draws a walk! Adam Dunn? Okay, the average is ugly, but look at that .383 career OBP. That’s why he’s making $12MM this season.
No, OBP has long been replaced as the statistic of choice by Moneyball believers. Their newest focus was hardly a secret either, and this offseason accentuated it more than ever. Accentuated it to the point where it now seems like every major league franchise is in on the secret. Which begs the question: can teams still identify bargains in the market by placing a premium on a player’s defense?
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I remember watching baseball as a kid. Even when I was 6 or 7, I loved statistics. I was just unnaturally into them. I’d even go so far to say that If I’d known about OPS, I would’ve loved it. Sure, the ones I typically committed to memory and focused on most were the basics: AVG, HR, RBI, and so on. Every single one of the non-pitching ones was offense-specific though. Defensive stats? I knew errors, and maybe fielding percentage, but I certainly wouldn’t knock a player for having a fielding percentage of .970 instead of .985.
The irony is that even Moneyball subscribed to this approach, to a certain extent. Once the A’s had acquired their high-OBP talent, they were content to play them anywhere on the field. Jeremy Giambi in the outfield, Scott Hatteberg at first base. Defense was marginalized, a talent far less important than the ability to get on base and hit for power.
In retrospect, it didn’t really make sense. I suppose the assumption was that if you’re a good enough ballplayer to make it to the big leagues, you can catch and throw a ball. The players who were better at doing these things, and who could cover more ground while they did them, couldn’t be that much better than the players who were merely adequate fielders, right? Well, not really.
When the sabermetric revolution tackled defense, another blatant irony was revealed: those players with few errors and high fielding percentages? Not necessarily great fielders. After all, a player that has the range to get to more balls is going to commit a few more errors than those jerks who just let them fall in for hits.
Torii who?
So, the invention of UZR (Ultimate Zone Rating) has placed an all-new importance on defense. You think that the Mariners were so eager to lock Franklin Gutierrez up to a long-term deal because of his .283/.339/.425 slash line in 2009, or might it also have had something to do with the fact that his UZR was an astounding +29.1 in center field? Yeah, his defense alone saved the Mariners 29 runs. Similarly, the Rays and Rangers, respectively, may not have been as patient in allowing B.J. Upton and Elvis Andrus to play every day last season if it weren’t for their defense. B.J. hit an ugly .241/.313/.373, but posted a UZR/150 of +11.8 in center. Andrus? A +11.7 UZR/150 at shortstop to go along with .267/.329/.373.
This year’s free agent class drove home, more than ever, that defense is a crucial aspect of every team’s evaluation of a player. Consider these examples:
Alex Gonzalez, SS (+10.5 UZR/150)
After posting a significantly above average UZR/150 for the third straight year, Gonzalez was signed extremely early in the winter by the Blue Jays, even earning a starting gig with them.
Chone Figgins, 3B (+18.8 UZR/150)
Despite being decidedly below average at nearly every other position he’d played, Figgins found his niche defensively over the last two seasons as the Angels’ third baseman. Figgins has the added bonus of being a strong on-base guy, reaching at a .386 clip over the past three years, but, with just nine homers over that same stretch, there’s no way he gets $36MM from the defense-happy Mariners if not for his prowess at the hot corner.
Adrian Beltre, 3B (+21.0 UZR/150)
Beltre represents perhaps the most extreme example from this year’s free agent class of strong defense improving a player’s worth. This guy was awful offensively last year, hitting just eight homers and OPSing .683 in 477 plate appearances. Since signing with Seattle, his OBP is only .317, and even his power has been mediocre — he’s averaging 24 home runs per 162 games. So why did a bidding war break out this winter for his services, culminating in Boston signing him to a one-year, $10MM(!) deal? Simple: his defense.
Johnny Damon, LF (-12.1 UZR/150)
Now let’s go the other way. Damon’s value was surely hurt this offseason by offensive numbers that were inflated by the new Yankee Stadium. However, his defense certainly didn’t do him any favours. Even heading into the offseason, many Yankees fans were set against bringing back both Damon and Matsui, since they couldn’t imagine one of the two playing in the outfield all year. When the Tigers eventually signed Damon to a one-year contract worth $8MM, it was considered an overpay. Remember, Damon hit .282/.365/.489 last year — Beltre, who signed for $10MM, hit .265/.304/.379.
Doing what he does best
Jermaine Dye, RF (-24.5 UZR/150)
And finally, my favourite example of the value of defense in 2010. Dye, a guy who has averaged 33 homers per season since 2005 and who hit 27 in a down year last season, is still without a job. Now, it’d be unfair to blame defense entirely. Dye’s contract demands are probably still unreasonably high. But is there any way a player like this remains unsigned on the eve of Opening Day five years ago? His near-league-worst UZR/150 (hat tip to Brad Hawpe for being an even worse defender than Dye) has National League teams scared of signing him and playing him in the outfield. So scared, in fact, that the Washington Nationals, who probably could afford him, are currently using a right-field platoon of Willy Taveras and Willie Harris. Willy Taveras and Willie Harris. Think about that.
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So, UZR is, at present, what OBP was when Moneyball was released: a statistic that had been exploited for a few years, but was becoming mainstream enough that it was increasingly difficult to use it for bargain-shopping anymore. The longer the Jermaine Dyes of the world remain unsigned, the more blatant the league-wide awareness of defensive skill is.
This leaves the question: What’s next? With an unprecedented amount of in-depth statistics available to even the casual fan, what one can a Major League General Manager possibly look at when he goes bargain hunting? Until they come up with a statistic to measure heart, the answer remains unclear.
